Nazi WWII Plan to Attack US With Sub Missiles

Nazi WWII Plan to Attack US With Sub Missiles

In the closing weeks of World War II in Europe, American intelligence determined that a detachment of German submarines had been dispatched to launch a cruise missile attack on the East Coast of the United States. The U.S. Navy deployed forty-six ships and dozens of aircraft to annihilate the incoming submarine wolf pack.

Ghost Ship

SMS Dresden

Following the almost complete destruction of Spee’s East Asia Squadron, Sturdee’s two battle cruisers were ordered to return home immediately. That left Stoddart’s cruisers to patrol the South Atlantic and the south-eastern coast of South America, although these would be joined shortly by other warships, including the battle cruiser Australia. The survival of the Dresden, however, and to a lesser extent that of the armed merchant cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich, caused Stoddart and the Admiralty serious concern. The root of the problem was that no one seemed to have any idea where Dresden might be lurking and British traffic along the Chilean coast was at a virtual standstill. The southern portion of that coastline consisted of such a labyrinth of bays, inlets, fjords, headlands, capes and islands that searching for a single ship was like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Stoddart was looking but having no success at all. At the Admiralty some thought that Dresden might be in hiding elsewhere, perhaps even in the East Indies, an alternative that would place the Australian and New Zealand trade routes at risk. At a time when British warships were being withdrawn to home waters, this would not be a welcome addition to available resources. Fisher, never one to lose an opportunity to plunge a knife into an enemy’s back, took full advantage of Dresden’s escape. ‘If the Dresden gets to the Bay of Bengal by means of colliers arranged with Berlin, we shall all owe a lot to Sturdee,’ was his vindictive comment.

In fact, the answer was a lot simpler. She changed her position regularly and was living a sort of hand-to-mouth existence on fuel supplies and rations supplied locally by an efficient organisation known as the Etappendienst (roughly, Service Organisation), which had been set up throughout South America on the outbreak of war to keep German ships supplied. In Chile there were some 28,000 immigrants of German origin, most living in small agricultural settlements close to the coast, but others were prominent members of the diplomatic, banking and business circles in cities like Santiago and Valparaiso and were eagerly recruited into the Etappendienst’s intelligence section. There were also some 4,000 former citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but as many of them hailed from Dalmatia and had little liking for the Vienna establishment, they were not considered to suitable material for recruitment. Against this, there were a number of neutral ship owners and masters only too happy to pocket German gold in exchange for partisan favours.

The British residents in Chile were at something of a disadvantage in these matters as they were smaller in numbers and more widely dispersed, the only community similar to that of the German settlements being a tiny Welsh community over the border in Argentine Patagonia. However, the Etappendienst made little attempt to conceal its own activities and carried out its work in so brazen a manner that British intelligence was able to accumulate so much evidence that by the end of November 1914 it became possible to lodge the strongest possible diplomatic protests. Non-German public opinion in Chile was outraged and the government had no wish to be seen as hostile to the United Kingdom. This placed a brake on the activities of the Etappendienst but was unable to halt them altogether.

Aboard the Dresden, Captain Ludecke wondered just how much the Berlin Admiralty expected him to achieve. Her presence was clearly affecting the movements of Allied shipping, which was not inclined to leave the safety of neutral harbours. This in itself meant that he was unable to prey on it, which was frustrating in the extreme. Again, while the Etappendienst could supply provisions and a limited quantity of coal, replenishing the cruiser’s magazine with 4.1-inch shells was beyond its powers. In fact, Ludecke had almost no main armament ammunition left, and certainly not enough for a prolonged engagement.

Following Dresden’s escape from the Battle of the Falklands, Ludecke had brought her round the Horn into the Pacific at midnight on 8 December. On the afternoon of 9 December he anchored her in Sholl Bay, Tierra del Fuego, to cut sufficient wood to replenish his fuel. Two days later a Chilean destroyer arrived and reminded him that as a combatant he had exceeded the twenty-four hours that belligerent warships were allowed to remain in neutral waters. He therefore up-anchored and proceeded to Punta Arenas, where he arrived on 12 December. The local authorities told him he could stay as long as was necessary to refill his coal bunkers, contravening government orders that Dresden was not to be allowed into the port on any account. In the event, Ludecke cut short his stay and put to sea again at midnight on 13 December.

That was the last most people heard of Dresden for many weeks. For the next fortnight she hid in Hewitt Bay, then moved to Weihnacht Bay. On 19 January 1915 a supply ship, the Sierra Cordoba, joined her there. In Ludecke’s opinion, she was not carrying sufficient coal for him to resume the role of a surface raider. In fact, the Etappendienst had despatched no less than five colliers that would enable him to strike wherever he wanted. These were the Gladstone, Josephina, Eleana Woorman, Bangor and Gottia, but for a variety of reasons none of them would reach him. The crew of the Gladstone disliked the risks involved in their work and mutinied even before they had rounded the Horn; Josephina was captured by the Cornwall near the Falkland Islands; Eleanore Woorman tried to run for it when challenged by the Australia and was sunk by gunfire in the same area; while Bangor and Gottia sailed, respectively, from Baltimore and Buenos Aires too late to play a part in subsequent events. On 21 January 1915 Ludecke received a signal from Berlin suggesting that he should try returning to Germany by following the same route as sailing vessels. One suspects the Kaiser’s involvement in the suggestion, which was hopelessly adrift from reality. The fact was that numerous sailing vessels of different nationalities would be encountered along the way Dresden would be identified, reported and tracked down. Ludecke replied that his engines were now in such a poor state that they would be unable to produce anything like the speed required to break through the Royal Navy’s North Sea blockade.

On 6 February Ludecke steamed Dresden into Quintepeu Fjord in the Gulf of Ancud. As the ship slipped through the narrow entrance to the fjord between towering cliffs that soared 1,500 feet above the level of the water, the rattle and clatter from her over-worked machinery filled the space with harsh echoes. When daylight began to fade a flotilla of sailing craft, assembled by the Etappendienst and led by a prominent German-Chilean merchant, Senor Enrique Oelkers, entered the fjord and berthed alongside the cruiser. Entire families had brought with them supplies, coal and some good things that had become just memories to Dresden’s seamen, including beer, sausages and strudel. Musical instruments were produced and a party followed. Oelkers had brought along several mechanics and they set to immediately, doing what they could to effect necessary repairs in the engine room. Some parts that could not be repaired on the spot were shipped to Puerto Montt and Calbuco, where facilities for their restoration existed.

On 14 February the pleasant interlude came to an end. Repaired and refuelled, Dresden and Sierra Cordoba pushed out into open water through a howling blizzard, leaving behind a persistent legend that they left a wooden box of Mexican treasure, waterproofed in tar. It has yet to be found and perhaps it is as well to remember that sailors’ yarns do not always dovetail exactly with naval history. Having reached a point some 200 miles off the Chilean coast, Ludecke turned north in search of prey. His search went unrewarded until 27 February when, 560 miles south-west of Valparaiso, he captured and scuttled the British barque Conway Castle, bound for Australia with 2,400 tons of barley aboard.

The fruitless efforts of Stoddart’s cruisers to locate Dresden had been watched with such amusement by the Etappendienst that its operatives decided to introduce a little wry humour. They spread reports that Dresden could be found in Last Hope Inlet, the furthest inland of a tangle of fjords reaching northwards from Smyth’s Channel. The inlet was searched twice, the only result being that Bristol damaged her rudder on an uncharted shoal and had to be dry-docked briefly.

At the end of February Ludecke sent Sierra Cordoba into Valparaiso to replenish her coal supply. At this stage he felt reasonably secure, but the truth was that Dresden was nearing the end of her career. Glasgow’s signals officer, Lieutenant Charles Stuart, intercepted a message from the Etappendienst to the Dresden. During the war’s early days a copy of the German signal code had been captured by the Imperial Russian Navy in the Baltic and passed to the British Admiralty. The Admiralty’s Room 40 OB had cracked the code in December and was able to inform Stoddart that the Etappendienst’s message instructed Dresden to meet her collier at a point 300 miles west of Coronel on 5 March. Kent was promptly ordered into the area but did not reach it until 7 March.

There was nothing to be seen and the following morning a heavy fog restricted visibility. During the afternoon the fog lifted, revealing Dresden lying some 12 miles to the west. Captain Allen immediately gave chase, working Kent up to a speed of 21 knots. Dresden, however, was known to be the fastest ship in her class and had benefited from the recent attention of Senor Oelkers and his mechanics. Despite the fact that Kent’s funnels were glowing red hot and trailing sparks she began to pull away steadily until by 20.00 she was hull down and all that Allen could see of her was her masts and funnel tops. Within an hour she had disappeared completely.

It was decided to shift the search to the remote Juan Fernandez Islands and in particular the island of Mas a Tierra. Three ships were involved – Luce’s Glasgow, Allen’s Kent and an armed transport, the Orama. At this point Stuart intercepted another message for Dresden. When decoded it instructed her to meet another collier at the group’s principal island, Mas a Fuera, also known today as Robinson Crusoe Island because for five years it had been the home of Alexander Selkirk, upon whose adventures Defoe had based his story.

Ludecke anchored Dresden in the island’s Cumberland Bay on 9 March. There was no sign of a collier and he had less than 100 tons of fuel in his bunkers. He received a signal from Berlin granting permission for him to accept internment. The island’s governor was informed that he would await the arrival of a Chilean warship so that the necessary formalities could be concluded and sent four of his officers off to Valparaiso in a local sailing ship so that they could retain their freedom.

When the British ships approached the bay on 14 March Dresden was still flying the German ensign and had therefore not been interned by the Chilean authorities. Glasgow opened fire at 8,400 yards, scoring hits with her first two salvos. Kent joined in and Dresden, unable to manoeuvre on account of still being anchored, replied to the best of her ability. This was not great as she had so little ammunition left and after three minutes’ firing Ludecke sent up a white flag to join his ensign. As this clearly indicated a wish to parley and discuss surrender terms, Luce also gave the order to cease firing.

A boat pulled away from Dresden to come alongside Glasgow. A smart lieutenant climbed to the deck, punctiliously saluted the quarter deck and the officer of the watch, and introduced himself as Wilhelm Canaris. He was taken to Luce’s cabin where he argued courteously for the best terms possible. For his part, Luce could only demand complete surrender as an alternative to sinking. It hardly mattered that no agreement was reached as Canaris had simply been sent to buy time while Ludecke and his crew opened their sea cocks, underwater torpedo tube doors and condensers to let in the sea. When it became obvious that this would take too long to sink the ship, explosive charges were rigged to blow out the bottom of her forward magazine.

As Canaris left it was observed that the German crew were leaving their ship and heading for the shore. Next, the Chilean governor arrived, outraged that the British had flagrantly disregarded his country’s neutrality and engaged in a battle against a vessel that was under the protection of his country’s flag, to say nothing of damage caused to Chilean property. The last claim was dubious in the extreme as Luce had ensured that the small settlement in the bay was well out of the line of fire. There could, however, be no doubt that in terms of international law he had acted improperly. A suitable apology accompanied by a bag containing £500 in gold as compensation for the ‘damage’ seemed to dilute the governor’s sense of outrage somewhat. At 10.45 a huge explosion erupted aboard the Dresden and she began to sink, slowly at first, then rolled over and disappeared.

During the short action eight of Dresden’s crew had been killed and sixteen wounded. Luce sent the latter to Valparaiso in Orama so that they could receive hospital treatment and did not request their internment. Four days after the sinking the British left following the arrival of a Chilean warship to transport the 300 officers and men of Dresden’s crew to internment on Quiriquina Island in Talcahuano Bay. The Etappendienst engineered the escape of several, the most prominent being Lieutenant Wilhelm Canaris who managed to make his way back to Germany, part of the journey allegedly being made through the United Kingdom. This would not have been too difficult as he was fluent in four languages, including English and Spanish, and was given every possible assistance by German merchants in Chile. Having reached England, it would not have been difficult for him to obtain a passage to Holland, Norway or Sweden, all of which were neutral and maintained communications with Germany. He subsequently served as a U – boat commander in the Mediterranean, ending the war with eighteen kills to his credit. In due course he rose to the rank of Admiral and during the Second World War he served as Chief of the Abwehr, the German Military Intelligence Service. On several occasions his position enabled him to frustrate the designs of Hitler and his Nazis, whom he hated. He was arrested in the wake of the July Bomb Plot against Hitler, imprisoned and humiliated, then hung just weeks before the war ended. During his time in office he kept a model of the Dresden on his desk as a reminder of a more honourable era.

As for Dresden herself, she remained alone on the bed of Cumberland Bay for many years. With the advent of scuba diving as a hobby she began to receive occasional visitors and was then used by the Chilean Navy for diver training. In recent years a team of Chilean and German divers recovered the ship’s bell which, in November 2008, was presented by the Chilean government to the German Armed Forces Museum in Dresden. The ship’s story caught the imagination of the novelist C.S. Forester and provided the inspiration for his book Brown on Resolution, which also deals with the fate of a German cruiser that has escaped from the Battle of the Falklands.

The Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) - North German Federal Navy

The Battle of Havana on 9 November 1870 was a single ship action between the German gunboat Meteor and the French aviso Bouvet off the coast of Havana, Cuba during the Franco-Prussian War. 

 

At 8 a. m. on November 7 the Meteor arrived in Havana harbour after leaving Nassau some days before. An hour later the French aviso Bouvet arrived from Martinique, steaming in from the opposite direction. The next day the French mail steamer SS Nouveau Monde left the harbour for Veracruz but was forced to return a few hours later due to fears that she would be captured by the Prussian gunboat. Later that day the Meteor's captain, issued a formal challenge to the captain of the Bouvet to fight a battle the next day. The Bouvet accepted and steamed out of the harbour to wait for the Meteor. The Meteor had to wait 24 hours before it could meet the French vessel due to neutrality laws, since Spain was a neutral country during the conflict. 

 

Upon the end of the 24-hour waiting period, the Meteor steamed out to meet the Bouvet which had been waiting 10 miles (16 km) off the border of the Cuban territorial sea. As soon as Meteor had passed the border line, Bouvet opened fire on the German gunboat. The battle came to an inconclusive end when the Bouvet, which had closed the range in an attempt to board the Meteor, suffered damage to a steam pipe which knocked out her propulsion and was forced to retreat into neutral waters under sail, whereupon she came under the protection of Spain once again. Neither ship was permanently disabled, mostly suffering damage to masts and rigging (the Bouvet's boilers and machinery remaining intact and functioning) and very few killed and injured on either side. The battle was not considered significant by commentators of the day.

Prussia’s victory over Austria in 1866 had led to the formation of the North German Confederation the following year and, with it, the transformation of the Royal Prussian Navy into the North German Federal Navy. In the summer of 1867 the navy took possession of the armored frigates Friedrich Carl (6,000 tons, from La Seyne) and Kronprinz (5,800 tons, from Samuda), followed early in 1869 by the 9,800-ton armored frigate König Wilhelm, the former Turkish Fatikh, which the navy had purchased from the Thames Iron Works in 1867 after the sultan defaulted on its contract. Krupp received the artillery contracts for all three ships, having developed all-steel muzzle- loading rifles superior to the latest Armstrong rifled muzzle loaders. 78 Production problems delayed delivery of the first guns until the summer of 1869, prompting the postponement of a scheduled West Indian cruise by the new “armored squadron” until the following summer. In July 1870 the onset of war with France forced another change of plans. 

Wishing to complete the process of German unification with a victorious war against the French, Bismarck succeeded in baiting France into declaring war on Prussia on 19 July 1870. As the Prussian army and its allies from the lesser German states mobilized and crossed onto French soil, the north German navy deployed the small ram Prinz Adalbert as harbor watch at Hamburg and concentrated its three armored frigates with the small turret ship Arminius at the new North Sea base of Wilhelmshaven; meanwhile most of the unarmored fleet was dispersed to defend the Baltic coast. The French fleet enjoyed a great superiority over the north German navy. Its 400 warships included seventeen seagoing frigates in the same class with the König Wilhelm, Friedrich Carl, and Kronprinz. French navy leaders pondered attacks on Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, the destruction of merchant shipping, and cooperation with the army in landing troops on the north German coast. But the navy and the army had done little prewar planning for amphibious assaults, and the fleet included too few of the small vessels needed for close coastal operations. In any event, French navy leaders concluded that they could execute landings only on the beaches of the Baltic. Such operations were unthinkable without an alliance with Denmark, which resolved to remain neutral following the Prussian army’s invasion of France in the first days of the war. 

Nevertheless, the northern squadron, under Vice Admiral Bouët-Willaumez, moved from the Channel into the Baltic, while the Mediterranean squadron, under Vice Admiral Martin Fourichon, relocated to the North Sea. Together they seized enough merchantmen early in the war to deter German-flagged vessels from venturing out. At the onset of bad weather the French squadrons withdrew to Cherbourg, but by then the defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan (2 September 1870) had decided the outcome of the war. After the imperial government gave way to a republic over thirty warships were disarmed, their men and guns put to use ashore in the defense of Paris and other northern cities. Meanwhile, naval units left in the Mediterranean evacuated the French garrison from Rome, abandoning the city to be annexed by Italy. France pursued the war for another five months, sustained in part by American arms shipments that the north German navy could do nothing to stop. The only action beyond European waters came on 9 November 1870, when the 350-ton screw gunboat Meteor, commanded by future admiral Eduard Knorr, engaged the 800-ton dispatch steamer Bouvet in an inconclusive two-hour duel off Havana. 

Throughout the war, the north German navy at best annoyed the French. Admiral Prince Adalbert himself underscored the irrelevance of sea power in the Prussian– German strategy by spending the war with the army, as he had in 1866. At the end of the first week of August 1870, Vice Admiral Jachmann took the König Wilhelm, the Kronprinz, the Friedrich Carl, and the Arminius on a sortie all the way to the Dogger Bank but encountered no French warships. The French made their first appearance in the North Sea, off Wilhelmshaven, shortly after Jachmann returned to port. Thereafter, the durable Arminius went out on more than forty sorties while the armored frigates were idled by engine trouble. 

On 11 September Jachmann finally took all three frigates out on a second squadron sortie, but by then the French already had left for home. After the French navy seized a number of German merchant ships early in the war, Bismarck authorized commerce raiding against the French merchant marine. In November 1870, after most of the French navy had returned home, Captain Johannes Weickhmann took the corvette Augusta to the Atlantic coast of France, where he captured three ships at the mouth of the Gironde in January 1871. The action caused alarm in nearby Bordeaux, then serving as temporary capital of the new Third Republic. With several French armored frigates bearing down on him, Weickhmann took the Augusta to the safety of Vigo in neutral Spain, where it remained blockaded until the war ended. The Augusta’s three prizes were the only French merchantmen taken by the Germans in the war. In comparison, the French navy captured no German warships but seized more than 200 merchantmen, paralyzing German overseas trade for more than half a year. 

At its birth the German empire ranked as the foremost military power in Europe, but the negligible role played by the Prussian and the north German navy in the wars of German unification left deep scars on the younger generation of the officer corps. The frustrated young men included Lieutenant Alfred Tirpitz, then 21 years old, who spent most of the Franco-Prussian War at anchor in Wilhelmshaven aboard the König Wilhelm. For Tirpitz, the humiliation of 1870 helped shape his later conviction that Germany must have a fleet capable of offensive action.

Imperial German Navy -1918

SMS Baden, with her main battery trained to port.

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg had resigned as Chancellor in July 1917 after the disgrace of America's declaration of war. He was succeeded by a procession of nonentities until October 1, 1918, when Prince Max, the Kaiser's cousin, assumed the office-but did so on the condition that he would actively seek an armistice with the Allies. President Woodrow Wilson had issued an outline for peace in January, called the Fourteen Points, which Prince Max immediately accepted as the basis for negotiating a cease-fire, but by now events were creating their own momentum that was taking over. Max's determination to seek peace was fiercely opposed by Admiral Scheer, who was now the chief of staff of the Imperial German Navy, having taken over from Admiral von Holtzendorff, who had resigned in August when his health gave out. Scheer refused to accept the truth that the war was all but over, and continued to dream up offensive schemes for the submarine flotillas and the High Seas Fleet. It was this last, mad flurry of planning that created the catalyst that finally brought down the German Empire.

Col. General von Ludendorff was dismissed by the Kaiser on October 26, after presenting Wilhelm with a virtual ultimatum, asking the monarch to choose between von Ludendorff and Prince Max, essentially a choice between continuing a war already lost and finding a way to end the fighting. Wilhelm, seeing the future with startling clarity, understood that von Ludendorff- who by this time may have been slightly mad-was quite willing to plunge Germany into a gargantuan Gotterdammerung in order to preserve the German Army. As much as he loved the army, this was something Wilhelm was not prepared to do. With von Ludendorff gone-von Hindenburg remained as the chief of the Imperial General Staff in order to provide the army with a sense of stability as it began its withdrawal into Germany-Prince Max informed the Allies that Germany was prepared to accept an armistice under all the terms outlined in President Wilson's declaration. One by one her allies fell away, as Austria-Hungary concluded a separate peace on October 29, and Turkey followed suit two days after that.

It was now that Scheer and Franz von Hipper indulged in the greatest naval folly of the war. Von Hipper, now commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet, succeeding Scheer upon his promotion to chief of staff, minuted to Scheer that "an honorable battle by the fleet-even if it should be a fight to the death-will sow the seeds for a new German fleet in the future." Somehow both men convinced themselves that even if the whole of the High Seas Fleet were destroyed, if it did sufficient damage to the Grand Fleet in the process, that would create a certain amount of favorable influence for Germany in any peace negotiations. Secretly Scheer began to plan for one last all-out attack on the Royal Navy. Sending a messenger with oral instructions to von Hipper on October 22-"The High Seas Fleet is directed to attack the English fleet as soon as possible"-Scheer was committing a colossal act of insubordination, for he had neither the Kaiser's nor the Chancellor's approval for such an operation.

The plan was ambitious and under other circumstances might well have worked. The High Seas Fleet was now more powerful than ever, with 5 battlecruisers, 18 dreadnoughts, 12 light cruisers, and 72 destroyers. The basic concept was to lure the Grand Fleet into the waters roughly 100 miles north of Heligoland Bight, into freshly laid minefields and across six separate lines of lurking U-boats, which were expected to decimate the British battleships as they passed; the surviving British ships would then be engaged by the undamaged battleships and battlecruisers of the High Seas Fleet. The lure for the Grand Fleet was to be a series of hit-and-run raids by destroyers and light cruisers along the English coastline and into the Thames estuary. The tactical details were worked out by von Hipper, and Scheer gave his approval on October 27, the date for the operation being set for 30 October.

But rumors had begun to leak out, and in this case the story being spread among the crews of the High Seas Fleet was that the impending operation was a suicide mission-death and glory for the officers and a watery grave for the ordinary sailor. Two years earlier such a prospect might have been welcomed in the seamen's mess as in the wardroom, but by October 1918 the High Seas Fleet was no longer the finely trained and fiery battle fleet it had once been. Two years of idleness had sapped its strength and vigor and drained its morale, as the best and brightest of the sailors and young officers were transferred over to the submarine service, leaving the crews aboard the battleships and battlecruisers as little more than the dregs of the Imperial Navy, often the leavings of the Imperial Army, which meant that they were very poor-quality specimens indeed. The ships themselves were becoming dirty and shabby, falling into disrepair and desuetude, as the crews began neglecting the routines of maintenance that keep a ship alive.

The mutiny of the High Seas Fleet began quietly enough, when on October 27 forty-five stokers from the light cruiser Cuxhaven refused to return to their ship. That night a total of 300 men from the crews of the battlecruisers jumped ship and swam ashore, disappearing into the docks and warehouses of Wilhelmshaven's waterfront. When the battleships took up station in the Jade Roads the next day, the trouble began to spread more openly. Aboard Markgraf one seamen leaped atop a gun turret and called for three cheers for President Wilson, which the crew returned to the echo. The rot spread quickly after that, as Helgoland, Thüringen, Koenig, Kaiserin, and Kronprinz Wilhelm were all wracked by insubordination. Von Hipper, realizing that he was losing control of the fleet, cancelled the operation and dispersed the battle squadrons, a move that only spread the mutiny further. Within a week red flags were flying in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, as sailors paraded in the streets and loudly chanted for an end to the war and the overthrow of the monarchy. On November 9 a red flag was hoisted to the masthead of SMS Baden, von Hipper's own flagship, and the admiral knew that the end had come. Groups of sailors left Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for Germany's other great ports, and soon the red flags of revolution were flying all along the Baltic and North Sea coasts and spreading inland, as revolution gripped Germany and the Kaiser's throne, already teetering, began to collapse.

The same day that the red flag was raised aboard Baden, Admiral Scheer informed Wilhelm that the navy could no longer be counted upon to obey his orders or those of anyone else. Within hours von Hindenburg informed Wilhelm that the same situation applied to the army. That evening the Kaiser abdicated and fled to the Netherlands, never to see Germany again for the remaining 22 years of his life. The German Empire had fallen, its collapse precipitated by the mutiny of what had once been one of its greatest instruments of power, the High Seas Fleet.

German Navy: A History

The history of the German navy begins with the creation of the Deutsche Bundesflotte in 1848–1849 by the National Assembly in Frankfurt. The Bundesflotte fought only one battle, off Helgoland on 4 June 1849, before being dismantled after the collapse of the Frankfurt government. The navy became a symbol of national unity and was strongly supported by the liberal movement and the growing middle class. The enthusiasm for a navy in this period presaged several themes that would play an important part in future naval developments: the desire for a fleet to match that of Great Britain; recognition that building a navy would have to be done in steps; and the national role of the navy in the creation of German unity.

Increasing conflict between the German Confederation and Denmark in the 1860s and a revived national unity movement led to a renewed public interest in the establishment of a German fleet. During this second wave of “navalism” the Prussian navy greatly expanded its overseas activities in promotion and protection of trade and economic interests. Establishment of the North German Confederation and the Norddeutsche Bundesmarine in 1867 represented the most significant expression of Reich-centeredness since 1848 and resulted in approval for a new building program and the development of an overseas policy, with China as the most important location for new naval bases.

The navy, however, had only a minor role in the final stage of Prussia’s national unification of Germany in the victory over France in 1871, a fact that dampened the support and enthusiasm for a navy. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who wanted only a small navy so as to avoid any conflict with Britain, appointed an army general, Albrecht von Stosch, as chief of the Admiralty on 1 January 1872. In an attempt to regain the popularity of the navy with the liberal nationalists, Stosch renamed it the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy) and implemented a construction program that would give Germany the third largest armored fleet in the world, albeit briefly.

The navy’s desire to justify its existence in light of its passivity and ineffectiveness in the Franco-Prussian War led it to emphasize an offensive spirit. Operational planning remained largely theoretical, however, with little contact with the fleet commanders or the army. Although Chancellor Bismarck was not a “fleet enthusiast,” his concept of a balance of power on the seas and the idea of having a navy of the second rank as an “alliance factor” (Bundnisfahigkeit) later played a role in Germany’s naval-political strategy. Stosch’s rivalry with Bismarck and the sinking of the Grosser Kurfurst in 1878 led to increased criticism and a public loss of confidence in the navy.

Stosch’s mix of ship types and rapid changes in technology and the confusion caused by the French Jeune École made it difficult for Stosch’s successor, another army general, Leo von Caprivi (1883–1888), to develop any coherent expansion program or strategy. Caprivi supported the construction of torpedo boats in the face of what he considered to be an imminent threat of war, as well as overseas cruisers to support Bismarck’s colonial policies.

New Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888–1918) was an enthusiastic advocate of an expanded navy, but he wavered, as did his officers, between a battleship and cruiser navy. However, his support helped restore the prestige of the navy and heightened its appeal as a symbol of nationalism, along with German aspirations for world power.

In 1897 Kaiser Wilhelm II appointed Admiral Alfred Tirpitz head of the Imperial Navy Office (Reichsmarineamt). This proved a turning point, not only for the German Navy but for Germany itself. Tirpitz swiftly developed a plan that skillfully combined political, military, ideological, and economic justifications for a navy. Tirpitz sought to defend the navy against all critics. He perpetuated the fragmentation of command created by the Kaiser to maintain his bureaucratic control, and he vigorously defended his departmental interests.

Under Tirpitz, a unique “German school” of naval thought emerged. This merged the Prussian-Clausewitzian influence and the navalism of Alfred Thayer Mahan into a military and political ideology of sea power. Tirpitz’s “risk theory” that a German battle fleet would serve as a deterrent against England, was a cover for his aspiration to challenge Britain for world naval dominance.

The primacy of the battle fleet and Tirpitz’s dogma of seeking the decisive battle from its North Sea base contributed to the contradictions and illusions in German naval strategy and tactics, as well as its construction program. To get through the danger zone in which the German fleet would be vulnerable to a British attack, Tirpitz planned to build his fleet in stages.

The advent of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 and the spiraling cost of battleship construction intensified a naval race that Germany could not win and a coalition of foes it could not defeat. By the outbreak of war in August 1914, the High Seas Fleet, although the world’s second largest, was clearly outclassed by the Royal Navy. Germany had in service 15 dreadnought battleships and 5 battle cruisers to Britain’s 22 dreadnoughts and 9 battle cruisers. The difference was even more pronounced in terms of other warships. Germany had 22 predreadnought battleships to Britain’s 40, 40 cruisers of all types to Britain’s 87, 90 destroyers to Britain’s 221, 115 torpedo boats to Britain’s 109, and 32 submarines to Britain’s 73.

The inactivity of the High Seas Fleet save for the 1916 Battle of Jutland demonstrated the fallacies in Tirpitz’s planning and strategy and led directly to the implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, which brought the United States into the war. The naval mutinies in 1917 and 1918 that precipitated revolution in Germany, the scuttling of the interned High Seas Fleet in Scapa Flow in 1919, and the draconian naval terms of the Treaty of Versailles left the Weimar Republic’s Reichsmarine with little popular support and a handful of obsolete ships. The Weimar Republic’s naval leaders, however, continued to believe in the political claims of Tirpitz’s sea power ideology that only a navy of the “first magnitude” would serve as an instrument of power politics and a symbol of Germany’s world power.

Following Admiral Adolf von Trotha’s ill-advised support for an aborted right-wing coup attempt in March 1920 (the Kapp Putsch), the navy’s already tenuous relationship with the supporters of the republic threatened its very existence. The navy’s secret rearmament attempts and blatant violations of the treaty as revealed by the Lohmann scandal of 1927 and controversy over the building of the navy’s new 10,000-ton “pocket battleship” (Panzerschiff) further increased its isolation. The navy became a force existing for its own purposes and sense of destiny, disengaged intellectually and professionally from the legal state and its institutions. In 1928 the new navy chief, Admiral Erich Raeder (1928–1943), whose Ressorteifer (departmental self-interest) matched that of his mentor Tirpitz, established an authoritarian, centralized command over “his” navy. In spite of his disavowal of party politics, Raeder sought to build support for expanding the fleet beyond its modest role in Germany’s national defense. With Hitler’s appointment as chancellor in 1933, the Führer’s “national” and “social” program found a close affinity with the long-term goals of the naval leadership, and the navy followed a leader who it believed had both the desire and power to fulfill its aspirations.

Raeder believed that he had educated the Führer as to the necessity of a fleet as a power and alliance factor. Hitler’s short-term plans included an accommodation with Britain in return for its acquiescence in Germany’s continental expansion. The June 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty limited the size of the Kriegsmarine to 35 percent the tonnage of the Royal Navy, although it gave Germany parity in submarines.

Raeder regarded the treaty as temporary. Germany was now free to build U-boats again and to develop a balanced fleet that would be ready by 1944 to support Hitler’s next stage of military expansion. Raeder and his officers believed war with Britain and later even the United States and Japan was inevitable. The 1939 “Z” Plan, the culmination of the turn against England that had begun in 1937, would provide a deterrent while serving as the basis of an even larger blue-water fleet (as seen in proposed 1940 and 1941 construction programs).

The continuity between the navies of the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich demonstrated that the navy’s war aims were not tied to questions of national security or living space but were an expression of the navy’s attempts to expand its power and influence. This could only be accomplished through Germany’s being a world power with a world fleet—and this was the final goal for both the navy and the Führer.

As Raeder began to worry that war with England would come sooner rather than later, Hitler refused to allow any change in the building of battleships over U-boats or cruisers. When World War II began in September 1939, Raeder lamented that all his small navy could do was “die gallantly.” The German surface fleet consisted of 2 battleships, 3 pocket battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 6 light cruisers, and 33 destroyers and torpedo boats. Fewer than half of the 57 U-boats available were suitable for Atlantic operations.

Raeder persistently argued that only all-out economic warfare could have any effect on Britain, and he planned a full-scale offensive of cruiser warfare on a global basis to force London to divide its forces. Restrictions—particularly on U-boats early in the war—and a temporary halt in the U-boat construction program frustrated Raeder’s attempts to seize the initiative and achieve early success, as well as avoid comparisons of the Kriegsmarine with the High Seas Fleet in 1914–1918. The navy regarded the successful surprise invasion of Norway and Denmark (Operation weser) in April 1940 as its major feat of arms in this stage of the war, but they lost 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers in the operation. The loss of the Bismarck in May 1941, however, led directly to Raeder’s final break with Hitler in December 1942. Nonetheless, the Channel Dash in February 1942—the escape of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen to Norway—was a strategic defeat for the navy.

In the aftermath of the defeat of France in 1940, Raeder tried unsuccessfully to redirect Hitler to the Mediterranean as a viable alternative to the invasion of the Soviet Union and as an indirect means of attacking England. With the fleet tied to Norway, the U-boat arm under its commander, Karl Dönitz, continued its role as the navy’s primary weapon. The navy, however, never resolved the issue of whether the U-boat war was a “tonnage war” or a commerce war in which U-boats attacked targets that had the greatest potential for a decisive impact. The defeat of the U-boats in May 1943 both technologically and through Allied successes in code breaking reflected the shortcomings in the naval leadership and military structure of the Third Reich.

The final act of the German navy in World War II was a considerable undertaking: the massive evacuation of civilians and soldiers from the Eastern Front in the Baltic. As a reward for the loyalty and steadfastness of the navy, at the end of the war Hitler appointed Dönitz as his successor, in sharp contrast to the navy’s ignominious end in 1918.

The developing Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union provided the opportunity and framework for naval rearmament in the newly created Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Bundesmarine and the Volksmarine developed within the framework of the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances. In 1990, after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, the Volksmarine was integrated into the new Deutsche Marine. This new German navy is a blue-water navy with a balanced fleet specializing in narrow-seas warfare. In 2001 the German Navy numbered 2 destroyers, 12 frigates with an additional 3 building, 14 patrol submarines with 4 more under construction, 30 guided missile patrol boats, 17 mine hunters, and 2 naval air squadrons. Naval personnel number some 27,000, almost twice that of the navy of the Weimar Republic.

Operating under NATO’s strategic framework, the Defense Capabilities Initiative of 1999, the Deutsche Marine deploys its forces beyond the borders of the alliance in order to respond to crises such as Somalia or Yugoslavia. The navy also participates in combined joint task forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, including two NATO mine countermeasures task forces in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean.

References

Bird, Keith. German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature. New York: Garland Press, 1985.

Herwig, Holger H. “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918. Rev. ed. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ashfield Press, 1987.

Sondhaus, Lawrence. Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power before the Tirpitz Era. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Thomas, Charles S. The German Navy in the Nazi Era. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Von der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969