Count Helmuth Karl Bernard von Moltke

The Prussian soldier Count Helmuth Karl Bernard von Moltke (1800-1891) was the military architect of the wars of German unification. He served as chief of the Prussian general staff from 1857 to 1888.

Helmuth von Moltke was born on Oct. 26, 1800, in Parchim, Mecklenburg, to German-Danish parents impoverished by the Napoleonic Wars. Educated in the Copenhagen Royal Cadet Corps (1811-1817), Moltke began Danish service in 1819 but in 1822 transferred to Prussia as an infantry lieutenant. He did little regimental duty, attending the Berlin Kriegsakademie from 1823 to 1826 and working in the general staff’s topographical office from 1828 to 1831. Moltke wrote technical studies, histories, translations, and fiction in attempts to advance his career, which in 1829 he diagnosed as suffering from his own weakness of character. In 1833 he became a first lieutenant in the general staff and in 1835 a captain.

In September 1835 Moltke became an adviser to the Turkish army, which he joined for the calamitous 1839 campaign in Syria. Moltke’s maps, sketches, and watercolors of the Near East all showed versatility. After his 1840 reentry into Prussian service, the 1841 publication of his Turkish Letters established him as an author of some popularity.

Domestically happy in his childless marriage (1842- 1868) to an English wife, Marie Burt, Moltke served on the Coblenz staff and the transport section and general staff at Berlin, then briefly headed the Magdeburg staff. Royal unwillingness to use the Prussian army during the Revolution of 1848 briefly caused Moltke to consider migrating to Australia as a farmer. However, service as adjutant to Prince Henry in Rome, and later to Crown Prince Frederick William, gave Moltke diplomatic experience, more rapid promotion, the material for more ‘‘travel books,’’ and the soubriquet of ‘‘the man who knows how to be silent in seven languages.’’

Chief of Staff

On Oct. 29, 1857, Maj. Gen. Moltke became chief of staff. He changed little in staff organization but emphasized modern technology in all sections. General strategy and a two-front war plan produced in 1860 occupied much of Moltke’s personal attention.

The Austro-Prussian attack on the Danes over Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 was so mismanaged by Baron F. H. E. von Wrangel’s chief of staff, Eduard Vogel von Falckenstein, that the latter was superseded by Moltke, who soon brought the Danes to terms. This promotion to a field post was then accounted the climax of Moltke’s career, as well as a triumph of ‘‘staff’’ over ‘‘regulars.’’

In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 King William I and Minister-President Otto von Bismarck entrusted the deployment of forces to Moltke, who telegraphed laconic ‘‘general directives’’ from Berlin for the rapid convergence of 85 percent of the Prussian army against Austrian and Saxon forces in Bohemia. In the July 3 battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz) King William relied entirely on Moltke’s judgment through a closely contested, but finally decisive, engagement. The Austrian infantry was routed and demoralized, and the Hapsburgs hastened to agree to Bismarck’s terms. This blitzkrieg campaign made Moltke famous.

In the 1870-1871 war against France, Moltke detrained the 2d Army on the Rhine, expecting to win a defensive battle there before marching on Paris. The conversion of this deployment into a German invasion of France was a measure of Prussian staff capacity, Moltke’s confidence and adaptability, and French strategic passivity. The German army units cohered in a general advance, while the French units collapsed into pockets of local resistance. The surrender of Napoleon III at Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870) and Marshal Achille Bazaine at Metz (Oct. 28) opened the way to a siege of Paris. Moltke attended the proclamation of the German ‘‘Reich’’ (Jan. 18, 1871), followed by the January 28 armistice and May 10 Treaty of Frankfurt. In June 1871 ‘‘der Grosse Schweiger,’’ or ‘‘the Great Silent One,’’ as Moltke was called, was promoted to field marshal.

As chief of staff, Moltke consistently discounted the chances of complete success in a two-front war. A defensive victory on the Rhine or Vistula, followed by an offensive and a negotiated peace, was the essence of his strategy for conflict against France and Russia. Moltke’s view that ‘‘perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one’’ must be set against his opinion that ‘‘a war, even the most victorious, is a national misfortune’’ to begin to grasp the breadth of his military thinking. After his retirement in 1888, he took an increasingly critical view of Kaiser William II. Moltke continued to be politically active, however, until his death in Berlin on April 24, 1891.

The lank, bewigged, half-Danish Moltke has been called a ‘‘general on wheels’’ as distinct from his military predecessors on horseback. This expression grasps only the particular form—railway deployment—most salient in Moltke’s emphasis on modern technology as part of the totality of a military enterprise. It was the breadth and versatility of his mind that gave dimension to Moltke’s personal motto: ‘‘First weigh, then wage.’’ Moltke thus considered every strategic problem ‘‘simply common sense,’’ but his method of analysis was so demanding that Paul von Hindenburg accounted Moltke ‘‘unlike all the other German generals.’’ If the German general staff proved unable to inherit Moltke’s strategic system, the German army for a time was inspirited by his motto for its officers: ‘‘Be more than you seem.’’

Further Reading A primary source for Moltke’s life is Moltke: His Life and Character, Sketched in Journals, Letters, Memoirs, a Novel, and Autobiographical Notes, translated by Mary Herms (1892). Further biographical information is in William O’Connor Morris, Moltke: A Biographical and Critical Study (2d ed. 1894); Friedrich August Dressler, Moltke in His Home (trans. 1906); and Frederick Ernest Whitton, Moltke (1921).

German Colonial Wars (1884–1919)

A short-lived “place in the sun.” The young German Empire did not establish colonies until 1884, and then mostly in areas of little economic or strategic value. It took the expenditure of military resources both to found and to maintain Germany’s place in the sun.

Beginning in 1884 the German flag was raised over several territories in Africa: Togo, Cameroon, German Southwest Africa (Namibia), and German East Africa (Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi). In the Pacific, Germany also claimed possession of northeast New Guinea and the Marshall and Solomon Islands, with the close support of the German navy.

The first military action was in Cameroon in December 1884, when a naval landing party of 350 men defeated the forces of a pro-British chieftain. One of the leaders of this party was Lieutenant Reinhard Scheer, later commander of the High Seas Fleet during World War I.

The creation of German East Africa brought about more conflict, both with the sultan of Zanzibar and with Arab slave traders. A blockade of Zanzibar harbor in 1885 established the German presence. A subsequent blockade of the entire coast, this time in conjunction with the British Royal Navy in 1888, was directed against the slave trade.

As control of German territories extended further inland, it became necessary for the Germans to create a permanent protection force, the Schutztruppen. The Schutztruppen was composed mainly of native troops led by German officers.

In 1904, a large revolt by the Herero tribe broke out in southwest Africa. The Hereros were upset at losing their traditional pastures, and German traders had forced many Hereros into debt through unscrupulous practices. The impassable wastes between the Atlantic coast and the settled regions made transportation difficult: the Germans relied on a single narrow-gauge railway line that could support only one train per day. Through quick raids the Hereros were able to keep the Germans off balance.

The German public was shocked to hear of the revolt and were angry at the army’s inability to defeat the natives. This outcry led to 10,000 troops being shipped to southwest Africa. However, most of these troops were used just in pacifying the countryside. The only real battle of the revolt, at Waterberg on 11 August 1904, was fought before they arrived. A subsequent revolt in late 1904 by the Hottentots took nearly three years to quell simply because the vastly outnumbered natives used guerrilla tactics and avoided pitched battles.

Meanwhile, another revolt in East Africa was subdued with far fewer German soldiers. A number of tribes were persuaded of the magical properties of a potion of water, castor oil, and millet seeds. This “maji-maji” was said to turn German bullets to water. The uprising broke out in central East Africa in late July 1905.However,without any coordination between the various tribes, no serious threat was posed to German settlers. When the maji-maji was proven to be no defense against guns, the rebels quickly gave up the fight.

 An unfortunate feature common to both uprisings was the harshness of German reprisals. In southwest Africa, the Herero population plummeted from 80,000 in 1904 to 15,000 in 1911. In East Africa, the rebelling tribes were punished by having their crops destroyed; the resulting famine killed between 250,000 and 300,000 people, more than 10 times the number of natives who had taken up arms.

The empire was in no position to defend itself against Allied assault when World War I began in 1914. In Oceania, the German island chains were unprotected and easily taken by Australian and Japanese forces. The only resistance of note was by the port of Tsingtao, taken from China in 1897. Although a Japanese force laid siege at the outbreak of war, Tsingtao was not taken until 7 November.

In Africa, Togo was quickly overrun, Cameroon offered little resistance, and German Southwest Africa was taken by South African units. However, German East Africa posed an unexpected obstacle. The German commander, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, was a skilled jungle fighter. His Schutztruppen launched offenses against British-held Kenya. As well, the six-inch guns from a stranded German light cruiser were put to good use. The Schutztruppen in East Africa did not surrender until late November 1918 and the Armistice.

The German colonial empire produced no economic or political gain for Germany, rather the opposite when the costs of defense are weighed. Nevertheless, matters of honor dictated that Germans abroad should defend their newly acquired territories against both insurrection and foreign invasion. In the end, the German legacy in these areas vanished.

References and further reading: Bridgman, Jon M. The Revolt of the Hereros. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. Farwell, Byron. The Great War in Africa, 1914–1918. London:W.W. Norton, 1986. Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991.

THE MIGHTY HINDENBURG

 

The LZ 129 Hindenburg sits in its hangar at Rhein-Main, Frankfurt, Germany. Designed to revolutionize passenger travel, this mighty airship was the largest man-made object ever to fly. Measuring 245m (804ft) long and 41m (135ft) in diameter, it could carry up to 72 passengers and around 60 crew members. With its fiery destruction in May 1937, the age of the zeppelins came to an end.

The first of these airships, the Hindenburg, came into service in 1936, sporting Nazi swastikas. Powered by four 1,100hp diesel engines, it could carry 50 passengers at over 128kph (80mph) in unparalleled luxury. Where the Graf Zeppelin had crammed its passengers into a gondola, the Hindenburg used part of the massive hull for passenger accommodation on two decks. The upper deck had promenades on each side where passengers could stroll and gaze through panoramic windows. There was a dining room with linen-covered tables, a writing room, and a lounge with a baby grand piano. On the lower deck were bathrooms, a shower room, the crew’s quarters, the kitchen, and a smoking room.

The latter drew attention to the Hindenburg’s one fatal flaw: its vast envelope was filled with inflammable hydrogen. The zeppelin’s designers had intended to use helium, but the United States refused to supply it. Nevertheless, German engineers were sure that the Hindenburg was safe. A refit in the winter of 1936–37 upgraded it to accommodate 72 passengers, and in May 1937 it was ready to resume scheduled services between Frankfurt and Lakehurst. Ambitious plans were afoot for a German–US consortium to run a transatlantic service that would employ four airships. And then came the inferno of 6 May. As the Hindenburg met its mysterious and fiery end, international airship travel also went up in flames.

Whatever the specific reasons for the Hindenburg disaster, statistics suggest that airships were never really safe enough for passenger transport. Out of 161 airships built over three decades, 60 were destroyed in accidents, either through fire or structural failure. They were in any case too expensive to build and too slow to have provided the kind of mass international air travel that exists today. But for the Hindenburg disaster, giant rigid airships might just have found a niche as the cruiseliners of the sky. As it is, they have become no more than a remembered curiosity.