As winter 1942/43 set in, both the
Luftwaffe and USAAF worked feverishly on equipment and tactics.
Armorers on every American bomber base in England improvised fittings
in the noses of their B-17s and B-24s to accommodate various
additional machine guns. New formations and tactical doctrines, most
stemming from the fertile mind of the 305th Bomb Group commander,
Colonel Curtis LeMay, were established throughout the Eighth Air
Force. The staggered 18-plane combat box, known to the Germans as a
Pulk (bunch), was but one of his ideas.
The Bf 109 and Fw 190 models reaching
the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942 differed only in detail from those
of 1941. Both fighter designs showed unmistakable signs of reaching
maturity. Weights continued to rise, and engine power had to be
increased to keep pace. Barred from major increases in engine
compression ratios by Germany’s chronic shortage of high-strength,
high-temperature metal alloys and high-octane aviation fuel,
engineers sought chemical additives to increase the energy of the
detonations within the existing engines’ cylinders. The Bf 109G-1’s
DB 605A engine had introduced nitrous oxide (GM-1) injection as a
means of temporarily boosting engine power at altitude. The Bf 109G-4
was based on the G-1, but lacked the earlier fighter’s complicated
cockpit pressurization system, and was equipped with a new radio, the
FuG 16Z, which had multiple channels and homing capabilities. The Fw
190A-3 had a new BMW 801D-2 engine with greater power than its
predecessor. Cooling louvers cut into the cowling finally solved the
Focke-Wulf fighter’s overheating problem. The Fw 190A-3 was
succeeded in late 1942 by the A-4, which had the FuG 16Z radio. While
flying at their preferred altitudes the Bf 109G-4 and Fw 190A-4 were
equal in performance to the best RAF fighter, the Spitfire IX.
Most of the new fighters arriving at
JG 2 and JG 26 bases at the end of 1942 were Bf 109s. Kurt Tank’s
Fw 190 was now in chronic short supply. Having overcome most of its
original problems, it was now in great demand on all of the
Luftwaffe’s widespread combat fronts, for reconnaissance and
ground-attack duties as well as in its original air-superiority role.
If someone had to give them up, the two Kanalgeschwader were the most
logical choices, as the performance of the Fw 190 dropped off
markedly above 7,500 meters (25,000 ft.), which happened to be the
altitude flown by the B-17 formations. On the other hand, Willi
Messerschmitt’s latest fighter, the Bf 109G-4, was in its element
above 9,000 meters (30,000 ft.). By the spring of 1943, III./JG 26
was equipped exclusively with Messerschmitts, while I./JG 2 and
II./JG 26 were flying a mixture of Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs.
Mixed equipment did not prove satisfactory at the Gruppe level, and
these two Gruppen were allowed to turn in their Messerschmitts for
more Focke-Wulfs, remaining Fw 190 units until the war’s end.
When II./JG 2 returned from North
Africa it was re-equipped with Bf 109s. Each of the two
Kanalgeschwader now had two Fw 190 Gruppen and one Bf 109 Gruppe. The
Bf 109 was an excellent dogfighter, especially at high altitudes, and
later played a useful role as high cover over Germany, taking on the
Allied escort fighters while the Fw 190 units concentrated on the
bombers. However, the fighters of Luftflotte 3 rarely had time to
form up for such coordinated attacks, and the Bf 109 and Fw 190
Gruppen were forced to attack the bomber formations independently.
The Fw 190A-4’s armament mix of two MG 17 light machine guns, two
MG FF 20-mm cannon, and two MG 151/20 20-mm cannon was considered
effective against all targets. However, the Bf 109G-4’s standard
armament of two MG 17s and one MG 151/20 was too light to do much
damage to B-17s and B-24s. In the next model of the Messerschmitt
fighter to enter service, the Bf 109G-6, the MG 17s were replaced
with heavier MG 131s. Plumbing for yet another chemical additive, MW
50 (methanol–water), was added to increase low-altitude
performance, but most pilots noted instead the deterioration in
maneuverability resulting from its increased weight. They gave it the
derisory nickname “Beule” (boil) for the bulky fairings covering
the MG 131 breeches.
The Bf 109 was always notorious for
its fragile construction. All in all, the Fw 190 was a much more
survivable aircraft, and was the mount preferred by most of the
western Jagdflieger (fighter pilots) in 1942–3. Erich Schwarz, an
experienced Kanaljäger (Channel fighter), quoted a favorite saying
in JG 26: “When a Focke-Wulf crashed, Professor Tank made the
broken parts thicker. When a Bf 109 crashed, Professor Messerschmitt
made the parts that had held together thinner.” In Schwarz’s
opinion, “The Bf 109 was a good airplane, but could not compare
with the Fw 190. The Bf 109 had great success in the east, but the
enemy there did not have the technically developed arsenal that we
faced in the west.”
General Galland kept the pressure on
Major Oesau and Major Schöpfel. Their percentage of successful
interceptions had to be sharply increased; only then might the new
threat be nipped in the bud. At year’s end Galland was working on a
set of detailed tactical regulations prescribing the methods of
attack on heavy bombers. In his post-war interrogation he summarized
their content as follows. Fighter units were to fly on a course
parallel to and on one side of the bombers until about 5 km (3 miles)
ahead of them. They were then to turn in by Schwärme and attack
head-on. They were to aim at the bombers’ cockpits, open fire at
800 meters (875 yards), and maintain a near-level course, passing
above their target after ceasing fire. The second approved attack
method was from the rear, which required concentrated attacks; the
fighters were to attack by Schwärme in rapid succession and at high
speed, and pass over the bombers after ceasing fire.
In Galland’s mind, one key to
success with these tactics was for the fighters to maintain
formation, or at least visual contact, in order to permit repeated
concentrated attacks. Keeping position above the bombers was
essential—and yet, from now until the end of the war, the German
pilot’s favorite method of ending an attack from either front or
rear was with a split-S, which left him far beneath the attacked
formation, and alone. Many pilots facing the hailstorm of defensive
fire felt an irresistible urge to break off their attacks too soon.
Although the bombers’ guns did not bring down many German fighters,
their streams of .50-inch tracers did in fact form an extremely
effective defensive shield. Despite Galland’s wishes, German
formation attacks were rarely carried out exactly as prescribed. Some
pilots would invariably break away prematurely, and the rest would
pass through the bomber formation at whatever angle and orientation
promised the best chance for survival. The formation leaders found it
difficult to reassemble the scattered fighters, and each successive
attack could be counted on for no greater than half the strength of
the one preceding it.
The Luftflotte 3 fighter commanders,
apparently on their own initiative, were themselves working to
improve the efficiency of their interceptions. Attack formations were
to be increased in size, and tactics were to be modified. On December
20, most attacks had been made from dead ahead—12 o’clock level,
as viewed from the bombers. The bombers were in effective firing
range for only a fraction of a second at the closing speed of roughly
900 km/h (550 mph), and the flat angle of attack and the high
altitude made range estimation extremely difficult. Pilots could not
help but worry about the possibility of colliding with their target,
and many broke off their attacks far too soon. JG 26 veteran Karl
Borris has stated that, after experimentation, the optimum attack
angle was found to be from dead ahead as before, but from ten degrees
above the horizontal. A constant angle of fire could be maintained,
similar to that practised often against ground targets. The proper
lead was attained by keeping the Revi’s crosshairs on the nose of
the bomber. Distance estimation was simplified, and even the less
experienced pilots could score hits. Thus was born the form of attack
most feared by bomber crews—from 12 o’clock high.
The year ended with the great German
offensive aspirations in south Russia and the Mediterranean in
tatters. A growing night-bomber offensive against the Reich’s
industrial and population centers demanded build-up of the integrated
radar, Flak, and night-fighter defenses. Yet the upper Luftwaffe
leadership still maintained that offensive air action was the best
way to keep the Reich’s enemies far from its borders. Bomber
production continued at a high level throughout 1942, and Luftwaffe
research and development teams pressed ahead with the next generation
of offensive air armament.
A recent student of German air
defenses has concluded, “By the end of 1942, the USAAF may have
been in the war, but from a German perspective it appeared to make
very little difference.” The Eighth Air Force had been blooded in
combat, and the German fighter pilots and command staffs from
Luftflotte 3 and Lw Bfh Mitte accorded the new enemy considerable
respect. Yet the measures taken to strengthen the daylight defenses
against this new threat remained piecemeal and counterproductive. The
needs of the combat fronts took precedence; fighter deployments in
Luftflotte 3 had to divide their efforts between air defense and a
number of other operational tasks, and the few regular fighter units
in the Reich territory had to be buttressed by training units. Yet
the Reich itself was virtually inviolate by day in 1942, and the
existing defenses seemed to be holding their own against
Anglo-American daylight strikes into the occupied western
territories. Jeschonnek definitely summed up the prevailing wisdom
when he told one of his staff officers, “Galland can take care of
the [daylight] defense in the west with one wing.” 1943 would see
this attitude put to a most severe test.
